In Re: Aspartame Antitrust by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-28-2011 
In Re: Aspartame Antitrust 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Aspartame Antitrust " (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1900. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1900 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                      
_____________ 
 
No. 09-1487 
_____________ 
 
IN RE: ASPARTAME ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
 
NOG, INC; SORBEE INTERNATIONAL, LTD.,  
                                            Appellants 
_____________    
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                             
District Court  No. 2-06-cv-01732 
District Judge: The Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
_____________                                       
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 25, 2011 
 
Before: McKee, Chief Judge, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
and STEARNS, District Judge
*
 
 
(Filed: January 28, 2011) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
*
 The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the District of 
Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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 This is an antitrust matter arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1.  Plaintiffs Nog, Inc. and Sorbee International, Ltd. represent a putative 
class of direct purchasers of Aspartame, an artificial sweetening product.  
Defendants are producers of Aspartame and entities related to its production, 
distribution, and supply.  According to the complaint, defendants conspired to, 
inter alia, fix the price of Aspartame.  Plaintiffs allege that this anticompetitive 
activity began no later than January 1, 1993, and that it persisted until December 
31, 2003.  The complaint characterizes this time frame as the class period. 
 Plaintiffs commenced suit on April 25, 2006.  Before this date, however, it 
had been a number of years since either entity actually purchased Aspartame.  
Sorbee‟s last product acquisition occurred in 2001.  Nog had not purchased the 
sweetener since 1995.  Defendants zeroed in on this time lapse and moved to 
dismiss the complaint for falling outside of the four-year statute of limitations 
applicable to federal antitrust claims.  Plaintiffs defeated the motion by attributing 
any delay to defendants‟ efforts to fraudulently conceal their anticompetitive 
behavior.  In a thorough memorandum addressing the motion, the District Court 
recognized that plaintiffs‟ factual allegations were “not robust.”  At the same time, 
the Court emphasized that statute of limitations issues generally should be 
adjudicated “on a developed factual record.”  Thus, the parties were permitted to 
proceed to discovery. 
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 Defendants deposed two key witnesses during the discovery period.  The 
first was Nog‟s president and Rule 30(b)(6) designee, Bruce Ritenburg III.  
According to Ritenburg, Nog purchased Aspartame from defendant NutraSweet on 
three occasions in 1994 and 1995.  The company procured a total of 13.23 pounds 
of the product, for which it paid $454.00.  Ritenburg testified that at the time of 
their purchase, NutraSweet was the lone supplier in the market.  He stated that 
although he believed “the price [for Aspartame] was out of sight,” no one at Nog 
complained to NutraSweet or attempted to negotiate a price reduction.  Ritenburg 
also conceded that he made no effort to investigate the price of Aspartame or the 
Aspartame market.  When pressed, Ritenburg acknowledged that he “didn‟t take 
any steps [between 1993 and 2003] to investigate [Nog‟s] claims or to exercise due 
diligence.”  He added, “I guess I didn‟t take it too seriously as far as getting out 
there and investigating all of these things.” 
 David Waxler, Sorbee‟s vice president and 30(b)(6) designee, provided a 
similar account.  Between 1997 and 2001, Sorbee purchased at least $47,500 worth 
of Aspartame.  Waxler was unable to say how Sorbee determined an appropriate 
purchase price.  He did not know whether Sorbee negotiated a price or whether the 
company made any attempt to procure Aspartame at a lower rate.  Furthermore, 
Waxler was unable to answer the most basic questions concerning the Aspartame 
market; he admitted that he had no understanding of the balance of supply and 
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demand, the fluctuation in the price of raw materials, or the prevailing price 
tendered by other direct purchasers.  At one point, defense counsel asked, “Is there 
anything that you know that the company did during th[e class] period to exercise 
due diligence?”  Waxler responded, “No.” 
 Defendants eventually moved for summary judgment on statute of 
limitations grounds.  The District Court granted the motion and held that (1) 
plaintiffs‟ Sherman Act claim accrued well outside the four-year period within 
which antitrust plaintiffs must initiate suit, and (2) plaintiffs failed to come forth 
with sufficient evidence to toll the limitations period under the doctrine of 
fraudulent concealment.  Plaintiffs later sought reconsideration of this ruling, but 
their request was denied.  We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the order granting summary judgment de novo, 
EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 A suit under the Sherman Act must be “commenced within four years after 
the cause of action accrued.”  15 U.S.C. § 15b.  “[A]n antitrust cause of action 
generally „accrues . . . when a defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff‟s 
business.‟”  W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 105-06 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 
321, 338 (1971)).  A plaintiff suffers antitrust injury by purchasing a product 
whose price was anticompetitively fixed.  See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 
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179, 189 (1997).  There is no question here that the plaintiffs‟ injury—assuming 
they suffered one—occurred well outside the four years allotted by statute.  
Plaintiffs attempt to overcome this shortcoming by invoking the equitable doctrine 
of fraudulent concealment. 
 The doctrine of fraudulent concealment works to toll the limitations period 
set forth by statute “when a plaintiff‟s cause of action has been obscured by the 
defendant‟s conduct.”  In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 160 (3d Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 977 (2003).  For the doctrine to apply, the plaintiff 
must prove the existence of the following:  “(1) fraudulent concealment; (2) failure 
on the part of the plaintiff to discover his cause of action notwithstanding such 
concealment; and (3) that such failure to discover occurred [notwithstanding] the 
exercise of due care on the part of the plaintiff.”  Id. (quoting 70 A.L.R. 498 
(1984)).  At summary judgment, the plaintiff must come forward with evidence to 
support each of these three prerequisites.  See Forbes v. Eagleson, 228 F.3d 471, 
487 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Absent evidence to support these findings there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact on the issue and the defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment.”), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929 (2001). 
 The District Court held that plaintiffs failed to come forth with evidence 
sufficient to satisfy either the second or third elements of the fraudulent 
concealment inquiry.  We need not address the second element, for we find that the 
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third element is dispositive here.  Even if we assume that defendants fraudulently 
concealed their anticompetitive conduct, there is simply no evidence to show that 
plaintiffs exercised the level of due care necessary to toll the limitations period. 
 A plaintiff who neglects to “take reasonable measures to uncover the 
existence of injury” is not entitled to the benefit of the fraudulent concealment 
doctrine.  Id. at 486 (quoting Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 
F.3d 1380, 1390 (3d Cir. 1994)).  It is undisputed that neither Nog nor Sorbee 
made any attempt to ensure that the price they paid for Aspartame was not the 
product of price-fixing.  In fact, when asked what steps their respective employers 
took to exercise due care during the class period, both 30(b)(6) designees admitted 
that they took none.  Plaintiffs contend that their complete inactivity is justified by 
the sophistication of defendants‟ concealment; in other words, they argue that until 
there is some outward indication of a price-fixing conspiracy, plaintiffs cannot be 
expected to do anything at all. 
 This argument would surely be more persuasive if it were factually accurate.  
It is not.  The District Court identified three “storm warnings” that, taken together, 
triggered a duty to exercise due care: (1) in the mid-1990s, plaintiffs believed that 
the purchase price of Aspartame was “out of sight,” and defendant NutraSweet was 
the sole supplier in the market; (2) several anti-competition suits were filed in 
foreign jurisdictions naming some of the above-captioned defendants and alleging 
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price-fixing in the Aspartame market; and (3) the 1993 publication of an academic 
study that depicted the contours of the Aspartame market.  According to the Court, 
these “„red flag[s]‟ . . . collectively revealed significant barriers to entry and lack of 
competition in the Aspartame market.”  We agree that the first two warnings 
identified by the Court triggered a duty to exercise reasonable diligence.  Although 
these warnings were not particularly ominous, they certainly required plaintiffs to 
do something.  See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 359 
F.3d 226, 238 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The more ominous the warnings, the more 
extensive the expected inquiry.”  (quoting Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 
Inc., 260 F.3d 239, 255 (3d Cir. 2001))).  Instead, both parties sat on their hands.  
Equity will not excuse such unjustified inactivity.  The order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment will be affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
